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Abstract—The Rowhammer bug allows unauthorized modifica-
tion of bits in DRAM cells from unprivileged software, enabling
powerful privilege-escalation attacks. Sophisticated Rowhammer
countermeasures have been presented, aiming at mitigating the
Rowhammer bug or its exploitation. However, the state of the art
provides insufficient insight on the completeness of these defenses.
In this paper, we present novel Rowhammer attack and
exploitation primitives, showing that even a combination of all
defenses is ineffective. Our new attack technique, one-location
hammering, breaks previous assumptions on requirements for
triggering the Rowhammer bug, i.e., we do not hammer multiple
DRAM rows but only keep one DRAM row constantly open.
Our new exploitation technique, opcode flipping, bypasses recent
isolation mechanisms by flipping bits in a predictable and
targeted way in userspace binaries. We replace conspicuous
and memory-exhausting spraying and grooming techniques with
a novel reliable technique called memory waylaying. Memory
waylaying exploits system-level optimizations and a side channel
to coax the operating system into placing target pages at attacker-
chosen physical locations. Finally, we abuse Intel SGX to hide
the attack entirely from the user and the operating system,
making any inspection or detection of the attack infeasible.
Our Rowhammer enclave can be used for coordinated denial-
of-service attacks in the cloud and for privilege escalation on
personal computers. We demonstrate that our attacks evade all
previously proposed countermeasures for commodity systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Rowhammer bug is a hardware reliability issue in
which an attacker repeatedly accesses (hammers) DRAM
cells to cause unauthorized changes in physically adjacent
memory locations. Since its initial discovery as a security
issue [44], Rowhammer’s ability to defy abstraction barriers
between different security domains has been extensively used
for mounting devastating attacks on various systems. Examples
of previous attacks include privilege escalation, from native
environments [65], from within a browser’s sandbox [24],
and from within virtual machines running on third-party
compute clouds [70], mounting fault attacks on cryptographic
primitives [10, 59], and obtaining root privileges on mobile
phones [68]. Recognizing the apparent danger, these attacks
have sparked interest in developing effective and efficient
mitigation techniques. While existing hardware countermea-
sures such as using memory with error-correction codes (ECC-
RAM) appear to make Rowhammer attacks harder [44], ECC-
RAM is intended for server computers and is typically not
supported on consumer-grade machines.
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Software-based mitigations, which can be implemented on
commodity systems, have also been proposed. These include
ad-hoc defense techniques such as doubling the RAM refresh
rates [44], removing unprivileged access to the pagemap
interface [45, 62, 65], and prohibiting the clflush instruc-
tion [65]. However, recent works have already bypassed these
countermeasures [6, 24, 68]. Other ad-hoc attempts, such as
disabling page deduplication by default [52, 60], only prevent
specific Rowhammer attacks exploiting these features [11, 59],
but not all Rowhammer attacks.
The research community proposed sophisticated defenses
which seemingly have solved the Rowhammer problem. Based
on the underlying primitives of these defenses, we introduce
a new systematic categorization into five defense classes:
• Static Analysis. Binary code is analyzed for specific
behavior, common in side-channel attacks, e.g., using high-
resolution timers or cache flush instructions [28, 35].
• Monitoring Performance Counters. Rowhammer relies
on frequent accesses to DRAM cells, e.g., using a Flush+
Reload loop. These frequent accesses are detected by moni-
toring CPU performance counters [6, 17, 25, 28, 35, 56, 75].
• Monitoring Memory Access Patterns. Rowhammer
causes unusual high-frequency memory access patterns to
two or more addresses in one DRAM bank. Rowhammer
can be stopped by detecting such access patterns [6, 18].
• Preventing Exhaustion-based Page Placement. Row-
hammer requires target pages to be on vulnerable memory
locations. All Rowhammer privilege escalation attacks so
far required memory exhaustion. Thus, preventing abuse of
memory exhaustion thwarts Rowhammer attacks [24, 68].
• Preventing Physical Proximity to Kernel Pages. As a
more complete solution, user and kernel memory cells are
physically isolated through the memory allocator, thwarting
all practical Rowhammer privilege-escalation attacks [12].
Notice that defenses in each class share the same assump-
tions, properties, and introduce the same form of protection.
Defenses from different classes complement each other. Thus,
given the extensive amount of research on Rowhammer coun-
termeasures, in this paper we ask the following question:
To what extent do the approaches above actually prevent
Rowhammer attacks? In particular, is it possible to success-
fully mount Rowhammer privilege-escalation attacks in the
presence of some (or even all) of the countermeasures above?
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A. Our Results and Contributions
In this paper, we show that despite numerous works on
mitigating Rowhammer attacks, much remains to be done
to truly understand their effectiveness and how to mitigate
them. For this purpose, we introduce a new categorization for
Rowhammer defenses (which we already outlined above) as
a foundation for a systematic evaluation. Demonstrating the
insufficiency of existing mitigation techniques, we present a
novel Rowhammer attack and subsequent exploitation tech-
niques for privilege escalation which allows defeating the un-
derlying assumptions of all of the countermeasures mentioned
above. In particular, our attack is still applicable even in the
presence of all of the above countermeasures. We now describe
the four building blocks of our attack and how each building
block invalidates the assumptions of the defense classes.
Defeating Physical Kernel Isolation. The assumption of
physical kernel isolation is that Rowhammer-based privilege
escalation is only practical by flipping bits in kernel pages.
We void this assumption by introducing opcode flipping, a
technique for malicious and unauthorized modification of a
userspace program’s instructions by causing bit flips in its
opcodes. By applying this technique to sudo, we bypass
authentication checks and obtain root privileges.
Defeating Memory Access Pattern Analysis. All known
Rowhammer techniques require frequent alternating accesses
to two or more DRAM cells in the same DRAM bank. Con-
sequently, countermeasures detect when an attacker performs
such alternating accesses to two or more addresses in the same
DRAM bank. We present one-location hammering, a new type
of Rowhammer attack which only hammers one single address.
Since our attack only uses one memory address, it does not
require any knowledge of physical addresses and DRAM
mappings [38, 57, 70], allowing us to perform Rowhammer
attacks with even fewer requirements.
Page Placement Without Memory Exhaustion. Page dedu-
plication is usually disabled for security reasons [52, 60, 68]
as a response to page deduplication attacks [8, 22, 66], includ-
ing deduplication-based Rowhammer attacks [11, 59], Hence,
attacks can only use memory exhaustion [24, 65, 68, 70] to
surgically place a target page on a vulnerable physical memory
location. Consequently, countermeasures aim to prevent adver-
sarial memory exhaustion [24, 68]. We introduce memory way-
laying, a reliable technique exploiting the Operating System
(OS) page cache to influence the physical location of a target
page. Unlike previous techniques, memory waylaying does not
exhaust the system memory and does not cause out-of-memory
situations, i.e., the system remains stable and responsive.
Defeating Countermeasures based on Performance Coun-
ters and Static Analysis. SGX is an x86 instruction-set
extension to securely and confidentially run programs in iso-
lated environments, called enclaves, on potentially adversary-
controlled systems. Enclaves run with regular user privileges
and are further restricted for their own security and safety, e.g.,
no system calls. To protect against compromised or malicious
OSs and hardware, the memory of the enclave is encrypted
to prevent any modification or inspection of the enclave’s
memory contents, even by the OS’s kernel and hardware
components [19]. Furthermore, enclaves are excluded from the
CPU performance counters [64]. Hence, this approach defeats
countermeasures which rely on monitoring performance coun-
ters [6, 25, 28, 56] or on analyzing the application code or
instruction stream for Rowhammer attacks [28, 35].
B. Attack Scenarios
Our attacks apply to personal computers and cloud systems.
Hence, we demonstrate our attacks in both of these scenarios.
• Native Privilege Escalation Attack. Our Rowhammer
enclave can be used on personal computers to gain root
privileges on the system, even in the presence of all of the
defenses mentioned above.
• A Cloud Denial-of-Service Attack. Our Rowhammer
enclave can also be used in the cloud, to shut down a large
number of cloud machines in a coordinated way, i.e., a
“distributed” denial-of-service attack, by abusing Intel SGX
security mechanisms. When SGX detects an error in the
encrypted and integrity-checked memory region, it halts the
entire machine until a manual power cycle is performed. By
coordinating the error injection over multiple machines, an
attacker can potentially take down an entire cloud provider.
C. Paper Outline
Section II provides background. Section III introduces a
new categorization of Rowhammer defenses. Section IV de-
fines our attacker model. Section V overviews our attack
and its building blocks, which are detailed in Section VI
(opcode flipping), Section VII (one-location hammering), and
Section VIII (memory waylaying). Section IX evaluates our
attacks in practical scenarios. Section X discusses limitations
and additional observations. We conclude in Section XI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we overview the Rowhammer bug and
defenses, discuss the prefetch side-channel attack which we
use in Section VIII, and provide background on Intel SGX.
A. The Rowhammer Bug
The increase in density and decrease in size of DRAM cells
leads to smaller capacitance of cells, allowing them to operate
using lower voltages and smaller charges. While these changes
have many advantages, such as an increase in DRAM capacity
and lower energy consumption, they also cause DRAM cells to
become more susceptible to disturbance errors and unintended
physical interactions between multiple cells. Such interactions
and disturbances often cause memory corruption, where the
bit-value of a DRAM cell is unintentionally flipped [54].
In 2014, Kim et al. [44] showed that such bit errors can be
caused in a DRAM row by rapidly accessing memory locations
in adjacent DRAM rows (also known as row hammering [29]).
To achieve these rapid DRAM accesses, data-caching mecha-
nisms need to be bypassed, either by flushing the cache, e.g.,
using clflush [44], cache eviction [1, 6, 24], or uncached
memory accesses [58]. We now describe different Rowhammer
techniques to obtain bit flips in the target row.
Single-sided hammering performs frequent memory ac-
cesses (hammering) to only one row which is adjacent to the
target row. In contrast, double-sided hammering hammers two
memory rows, one on each side of the target row. As the
two hammered rows must be on different sides of the target
row, double-sided hammering generally requires at least partial
knowledge of virtual-to-physical mappings while single-sided
hammering does not. Both hammering techniques produce
abnormal memory access patterns as they induce an enormous
number of row conflicts. Bit flips are highly reproducible:
Hammering the same offsets again yields the same bit flips.
Although the name single-sided hammering may suggest
that only a single memory location is hammered, Seaborn
and Dullien [65], who introduced this technique, hammer
8 memory locations simultaneously. On their systems, two
or more randomly selected addresses (i.e., no knowledge
of virtual-to-physical mappings is required) are in the same
DRAM bank in 61.4% of the cases. Hence, in fact, single-
sided hammering aims to hammer two memory locations in
the same bank, but not necessarily neighboring the victim row.
Not a privilege-escalation attack but an escape from the
NaCl sandbox was demonstrated by Seaborn and Dullien [65].
NaCl executes arbitrary generated code directly on the CPU
but sanitizes it using a blacklist, e.g., no system calls. To
bypass the sanitizer, the attacker generates and sprays unpriv-
ileged code over the entire memory and induces an unpre-
dictable random bit flip at an unpredictable random memory
location. With a low probability, the bit flip hits the operand
of an and instruction used to sanitize addresses used by the
sandboxed code. As the code can be read and executed by
the attacker, the attacker can verify whether the random bit
flip modified a random code location such pointers are not
fully sanitized, re-enabling traditional control-flow diversion
attacks. Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhyay [10] exploited ran-
dom Rowhammer bit flips in random memory locations to
produce faulty RSA signatures, to recover the secret key.
However, as bit flips are highly reliable, more deterministic
and reliable attacks have been mounted, including privilege-
escalation attacks, sandbox escapes, and compromise of cryp-
tographic keys were demonstrated using memory spraying [24,
65, 70], grooming [68], or page deduplication [11, 59].
B. Rowhammer Defenses
Rowhammer defenses can be divided into three categories
based on their goal. The first category aims to detect Row-
hammer and, after detection, stop the corresponding processes.
The second category aims to neutralize Rowhammer bit flips
to prevent their exploitation. The third category aims to elim-
inate Rowhammer bugs. We now review previous works on
defending against Rowhammer attacks. We group the proposed
countermeasures using the above-mentioned three categories.
Rowhammer Detection Countermeasures. Static code a-
nalysis could be used to detect microarchitectural attacks in
binaries in a fully automated way, e.g., when tested before
loading them into an app store [35]. Several works detect on-
going attacks using hardware- and software-based performance
counters [17, 18, 25, 28, 56, 75]. Herath and Fogh [28] detect
attacks by monitoring suspicious cache activity of processes
using performance counters and then searching for clflush
instructions near the instruction pointer.
Rowhammer Neutralization Countermeasures. The sys-
tem’s memory allocator only places kernel pages near
userspace pages in near-out-of-memory situations. Hence,
modifying the allocator to prefer the out-of-memory situation
over the proximate placement of kernel and userspace pages,
effectively prevents memory exhaustion in turn of spraying
and grooming [24, 68]. This prevents known Rowhammer
attacks based on memory grooming or memory spraying, as
the target page cannot be evicted or placed anymore, i.e.,
neutralizes Rowhammer bit flips. Generalizing this, Brasser
et al. [12] presents G-CATT, an alternative memory allocator
that isolates user and kernelspace in physical memory ensuring
that the attacker cannot exploit bit flips in kernel memory, thus
neutralizing Rowhammer-induced bit flips. Disabling page
deduplication prevents Rowhammer attacks exploiting these
features [11, 52, 59, 60].
Rowhammer Elimination Countermeasures. ANVIL [6]
uses performance counters to detect and subsequently miti-
gate Rowhammer attacks. More specifically, ANVIL uses the
CPU’s performance counters in order to continuously monitor
the amount of cache misses. When the amount of cache
misses exceeds a predetermined threshold, ANVIL’s second
stage is initiated, logging the addresses of cache misses.
Finally, ANVIL mitigates Rowhammer effects by selectively
refreshing nearby memory rows. However, as refreshing a
row imposes some performance penalties, ANVIL avoids
having a large number of false positives by discarding all
logged cases that do have a significant amount of accesses
to at least two rows in the same memory bank. While this
optimization improves ANVIL’s performance, as we discuss
in Section III, it also prevents ANVIL from detecting one-
location hammering, thus facilitating our attack. Similarly to
ANVIL’s detection approach, Corbet [18] discusses halting the
CPU when cache-miss rates exceed a threshold, slowing down
not only Rowhammer attacks but the entire system.
Brasser et al. [12] also presented B-CATT, a bootloader
extension blacklisting vulnerable locations, thus, effectively
reducing the amount of usable memory, but fully eliminating
the Rowhammer bug. However, Kim et al. [44] observed
that this approach is not practical as it would block almost
the entire memory. We validated this observation and found
more than 95% of the memory would be blocked, on several
of our systems. Eliminating Rowhammer by blacklisting the
clflush instruction [65] was shown ineffective with cache-
eviction-based Rowhammer attacks [1, 6, 24].
Besides building more reliable chips or employing ECC
modules, Kim et al. [44] and Kim et al. [43] proposed
probabilistic methods to eliminate bit flips in hardware. Every
time a row is opened and closed, other adjacent or non-
adjacent rows are opened with a low probability. Thus, if a
Rowhammer attack opens and closes rows, statistically the
adjacent rows are refreshed as well and, thus, bit flips are
averted. The LPDDR4 standard [37] specifies two features to
eliminate the Rowhammer bug: Target Row Refresh (TRR)
enables the memory controller to refresh rows adjacent to a
certain row; Maximum Activation Count (MAC) specifies how
often a row can be activated before adjacent rows need to
be refreshed. Furthermore, Ghasempour et al. [21] presented
ARMOR, a cache storing frequently accessed rows in order
to reduce the number of row activations in the DRAM and,
thus, eliminating the Rowhammer bug.
Hence, all elimination-based defenses are either not practi-
cal or require hardware changes, making them not applicable
for commodity systems. Commodity systems should instead be
protected using detection- or neutralization-based approaches.
C. The Prefetch Side-Channel Attack
The prefetch side-channel attack was presented by Gruss
et al. [23] as a way to defeat address-space-layout randomiza-
tion. The timing difference induced by the prefetch instruction
depends on the state of various caches. Prefetch instructions
ignore privileges and permissions. Prefetch side-channel at-
tacks also exploit the OS design. In most OSs, every valid
memory location in a user process is mapped at least twice,
once in the user process virtual memory, and once in the direct-
physical mapping in the kernelspace. The prefetch address-
translation oracle exploits this direct-physical mapping to
determine whether an address in userspace maps to a specific
address in the direct-physical mapping. If the guess was
correct, the attacker learns the physical address of a userspace
virtual address. Hence, the attacker does not have to rely on OS
interfaces to obtain physical addresses for virtual addresses.
D. Intel SGX
Intel SGX is an x86 instruction-set extension for integrity
and confidentiality of code and data in untrusted environ-
ments [19]. For this purpose, SGX executes programs in so-
called secure enclaves which use protected areas of memory
that can only be accessed by the enclaves themselves. With
SGX implemented in the CPU, the enclave remains protected,
even if OS, hypervisor, and hardware have been compromised.
Furthermore, remote attestation allows validating the integrity
of the enclave by proving its correct loading.
Intel SGX explicitly protects against DRAM-based attacks,
e.g., cold-boot attacks, memory bus snooping, and memory-
tampering attacks, by cryptographically ensuring confidential-
ity, integrity, and freshness of data stored in the main memory.
Hence, it removes the DRAM from the trusted computing
base. The memory containing code and data of running
enclaves is a physically contiguous and encrypted block in
the DRAM, called EPC (enclave page cache) area, which is
protected from all non-enclave memory accesses using pro-
tection mechanisms implemented in the CPU. The encryption
by the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) is transparent to
the processor’s cores [26]. The MEE utilizes a Merkle tree to
detect when the encrypted code and data stored in the DRAM
have been tampered with. The MEE provides freshness to the
integrity tags to mitigate replay attacks, i.e., replacing a new
encrypted page with an old encrypted page.
If an integrity or freshness error occurred, Intel SGX aborts
the execution of the memory fetch immediately, and the MEE
emits an error signal. Thus, the unverified data of the DRAM
will never be loaded into the last-level cache [26]. Moreover,
the MEE locks the memory controller, preventing any future
memory operations (potentially incurring data corruption),
causing the system to halt until it is rebooted.
E. Attacks on (and from) Secure Enclaves
While Intel does not claim to protect against side-channel
attacks that deduce information of collected power statistics,
performance statistics, branch statistics, or information on
pages accessed via page tables [4], several such attacks have
been demonstrated. Xu et al. [72] demonstrated a page fault
side-channel attack from a malicious OS to extract sensi-
tive information, e.g., text documents and images. Brasser
et al. [13] demonstrated a Prime+Probe cache side-channel
attack, extracting 70% of an RSA private key in an enclave.
Furthermore, Schwarz et al. [64] mounted a cache side-channel
attack from within an enclave to extract a full RSA private key
of a co-located enclave. Xiao et al. [71] mounted control-flow
inference attacks on recent SSL libraries running in secure
enclaves. Moghimi et al. [53] presented CacheZoom, a tool
that provides a high-resolution channel to track all memory
accesses of SGX enclaves to mount key recovery attacks.
Wang et al. [69] systematically analyzed side-channel threats
of SGX and identified 8 potential side-channel attack vectors.
However, Intel considers all of these attacks out of scope, due
to their side-channel nature.
Attacks that rely on shared memory (e.g., Flush+
Reload [73]) cannot be mounted, as enclave memory is in-
accessible for other enclaves, processes, and the OS. But as
DRAM rows are shared, Wang et al. [69] showed a cross-
enclave DRAMA attack (cf. [57]) on other enclaves.
In a concurrent and independent work, Jang et al. [36]
propose a denial-of-service attack running Rowhammer in
an SGX enclave. We compare their and our observations in
Section IX-A, where we describe a very similar attack.
III. CATEGORIZATION OF STATE-OF-THE-ART DEFENSES
FOR COMMODITY SYSTEMS
Discussing Rowhammer defenses based on their goal (de-
tection, neutralization, and elimination; cf. Section II-B), does
not allow a thorough analysis and comparison, as the primi-
tives of the different defenses in each category vary widely.
As we have seen in Section II-B, none of the elimination-
based defenses are practical or applicable to commodity sys-
tems. Hence, in this paper, we only focus on detection- and
neutralization-based defenses. In this section, we introduce a
novel systematic categorization for state-of-the-art defenses for
commodity systems.
In our evaluation of defenses we identified the following 5
defense classes which can be applied to commodity systems:
TABLE I: Rowhammer defenses for commodity systems.
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Performance Counters
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NEUTRALIZATION
Physical Proximity
Memory Footprint
ELIMINATION
Bootloader
Hardware Modification
BIOS Update
Symbols indicate whether a defense is part of defense class ( ), optional
aspects of the defense are part of a defense class ( ), or a defense is not part
of a defense class ( ).
D1. Detection through static analysis.
D2. Detection through performance counter analysis.
D3. Detection through analysis of memory access patterns.
D4. Prevention by strictly avoiding physical proximity.
D5. Prevention by preventing conspicuous memory footprints.
Other defense classes (bootloader- or BIOS-update-based)
have already been shown to be ineffective (cf. Section II-B), or
cannot be applied to commodity systems (hardware modifica-
tions). Table I provides an overview of Rowhammer defenses
and the corresponding defense classes. We defer a discussion
of hardware-based defenses to Section X-B.
In the following, we briefly describe the assumptions and
implications for each of the defense classes, as well as an
exhaustive list of defenses for each class.
Static Analysis. The underlying assumption of defenses based
on static analysis (D1) is that the attack (binary) code can
be accessed. This defense class is especially interesting for
offline analysis, e.g., before adding software to an app store.
If the detection works, the user cannot be attacked anymore.
Static analysis is used by Irazoqui et al. [35] in MASCAT, an
automated static code analysis tool to detect microarchitectural
attacks on a large scale. Herath and Fogh [28] proposed to
suspend programs with high cache miss rates and analyze
instructions near the instruction pointer.
Performance Counter Monitoring. The underlying assump-
tions of defenses based on performance counter analysis (D2)
are that the performance counters are available and that they
include operations of the attacker program. A typical param-
eter for Rowhammer detection is the number of cache hits
and cache misses. Detecting Rowhammer at runtime leaves
a theoretical chance of missing an attack. If the detection
works, attacks are stopped before they can exploit a bit
flip. The use of performance counters is the basis of several
defenses [25, 28, 56]. The underlying Flush+Reload loop of
Rowhammer is also detected by cache attack defenses [17, 75].
Memory Access Patterns Monitoring. The underlying as-
sumptions of defenses based on memory access patterns (D3)
are that Rowhammer attacks require a large number of cache
misses on one row, and a large cumulative number of accesses
on other rows in the same DRAM bank. Assuming this,
Rowhammer attacks can be detected and stopped before they
cause bit flips [6, 18]. ANVIL [6] detects Rowhammer in
two stages: First, it monitors the last-level cache miss ratio.
Next, if the cache miss ratio exceeds a threshold, ANVIL
uses Intel PEBS to monitor the addresses of cache misses and
distinguish Rowhammer attacks from legitimate work loads.
For every candidate row, “other row access samples from the
same DRAM bank” are checked (cf. Section 3.3 in [6]). Only
if there are enough accesses to other rows of the same bank,
an attack is detected and victim rows are refreshed [6].
Preventing Physical Proximity. The underlying assumption
of defenses based on preventing physical proximity (D4) is that
Rowhammer attacks need to flip bits in page tables or other
kernel pages to take over the system. A memory allocator can
prevent physical proximity of user pages and kernel pages.
G-CATT [12] is the only published defense in this class. G-
CATT isolates kernel pages from user pages by leaving a gap
in physical memory. If the isolation works, the user cannot
take over the kernel and the system anymore.
Memory Footprints. The underlying assumptions of defenses
based on prohibiting conspicuous memory footprints (D5) are
that Rowhammer attacks need to allocate large amounts of
memory to scan for bit flips and almost exhaust the entire
memory to surgically place a page in a specific physical
location to trigger and exploit a Rowhammer bit flip. While
the memory consumption of the attacker can already raise
suspicion, both spraying [24, 65] and grooming [68] easily
exhaust the entire memory in a way that gets the attacker
process killed by the OS. The memory allocator by default
already avoids placing kernel pages near userspace pages,
and it only deviates from this behavior in near-out-of-memory
situations. Not deviating from the default behavior to prevent
adversarial memory exhaustion was mentioned in Rowhammer
attack papers [24, 68]. If the memory allocator prevents
adversarial memory exhaustion, an attacker cannot force target
pages to specific memory locations anymore.
IV. ATTACKER MODEL
Our attacker model makes the following fundamental as-
sumptions about the hardware, the OS, installed defense
mechanisms, and attacker capabilities:
Hardware. The installed DRAM modules are susceptible
to Rowhammer bit flips and no dedicated hardware-based
Rowhammer defense mechanisms are in place.
Operating System. The OS is up-to-date and fully patched,
and no known software vulnerabilities exist that an attacker
could exploit to elevate privileges.
Defenses. The system is protected with state-of-the-art Row-
hammer defenses. Specifically, at least one defense from each
defense class is deployed, including static analysis [35], hard-
ware performance counters [6, 17, 25, 28, 56, 75], memory
access pattern analysis [6], physical proximity prevention [12],
and prevention of near-out-of-memory situations [24, 68].
TABLE II: How the different defense classes are bypassed.
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Intel SGX
One-location hammering
Opcode flipping
Memory waylaying
Defense class defeated
Attacker Capabilities. We assume that an attacker can start
an arbitrary unprivileged user program and that the attacker
can launch an SGX enclave, which is also unprivileged.
V. HIGH-LEVEL VIEW OF THE ATTACKS
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of the
attack primitives we develop for our privilege-escalation attack
in native environments and our denial-of-service attack in
cloud environments, despite the presence of defenses from all
defense classes from Section IV. Table II summarizes how we
defeat every single defense class.
To defeat defense class D1 (static analysis), we run our
attack inside an SGX enclave. Code in enclaves cannot be
read or inspected, as the processor prevents all accesses to the
enclave memory. By encrypting the code and only decrypting
it after the enclave is launched, a developer can hide arbitrary
code within SGX enclaves. Consequently, MASCAT [35] is
incapable of detecting any microarchitectural or Rowhammer
attack we perform inside the enclave. Furthermore, the instruc-
tion stream cannot be searched for clflush instructions [28].
Defense class D2 (performance counters) is also defeated
by running the attack inside an SGX enclave because the
processor does not include SGX activity in process-specific
performance counters for security reasons [31]. Confirming
this, Schwarz et al. [64] observed that performance counters
are not influenced by cache attacks running in SGX enclaves.
Hence, performance counters do not detect our attack.
One-location Hammering. To defeat defense class D3 (mem-
ory access patterns), we introduce a new attack primitive,
which we call one-location hammering. As older systems used
an “open-page” memory controller policy where a memory
row is kept open and buffered until the next memory row
is accessed, double-sided and single-sided hammering cause
frequent activations of rows by inducing cache misses on
different rows of the same bank [44]. Recently, however,
modern systems employ more sophisticated memory controller
policies, preemptively closing rows earlier than necessary, to
optimize performance (cf. Appendix C). We conjecture that
this change in policy creates a previously unknown Rowham-
mer effect, which we exploit with one-location hammering.
With one-location hammering, the attacker only runs a
Flush+Reload loop on a single memory address at the maxi-
mum frequency. This continuously re-opens the same DRAM
row, whenever the memory controller closes the row. We
observed that one-location hammering drains enough charge
from the DRAM cells to induce bit flips. As one-location
hammering does not access different rows in the same bank,
D3 defenses, such as the second stage of ANVIL [6], do not
detect the ongoing attack (cf. Section III). We describe one-
location hammering in detail in Section VII.
Opcode Flipping. To defeat defense class D4 (physical
memory isolation), we introduce another new attack primitive,
opcode flipping. All previous Rowhammer privilege-escalation
attacks induced bit flips in carefully crafted page tables. If
the page table modification is successful, the attacker gains
unrestricted read and write access to the physical memory,
which is equivalent to having kernel privileges [24, 65, 68, 70].
With opcode flipping, we propose a novel way to exploit
bit flips. In the x86 instruction set, bit flips in opcodes yield
other, in most cases, valid opcodes. We show that with only a
single targeted bit flip in an instruction, we can alter a (setuid)
binary, e.g., sudo, to provide an unprivileged process with
root privileges. As this is a bit flip in a user page, it breaks the
underlying assumption of defense class D4, i.e., G-CATT [12].
Previous attacks on unprivileged code [65] (cf. Section II-A
for a detailed discussion) bypassed sandbox code sanitization
by flipping bits in a bitmask used in a logical and in attacker-
sprayed code. In contrast to their work, we identify potential
target bit flips in any opcode in a shared binary or library,
modifying opcodes and the instruction stream. Consequently,
we illegitimately obtain root privileges by bypassing authen-
tication checks. We detail opcode flipping in Section VI.
Memory Waylaying. To defeat defense class D5 (memory
footprints), we introduce a novel alternative to memory spray-
ing and grooming, called memory waylaying. Rowhammer
attacks modify pages in a predictable way by placing them
in physical memory locations where a known bit flips occur.
There are two techniques to achieve this: With spraying the
attacker fills the entire memory with copies of the generated
data structure; with grooming the attacker allocates the data
structure to exploit in the exactly right moment. Both methods
require exhausting the entire memory and are easily detectable
by monitoring memory consumption. Memory waylaying per-
forms replacement-aware page cache eviction, using only
page cache pages. These pages are not visible in the system
memory utilization as they can be evicted any time and hence,
are considered as available memory. Consequently, memory
waylaying never causes the system to run out of memory.
We observed that page cache pages, after being discarded
from DRAM, are loaded to a new random physical location
upon access, on both Linux and Windows. Through continuous
eviction, the page is eventually placed on a vulnerable phys-
ical location. Memory waylaying leverages the prefetch side-
channel to detect when data in virtual memory is placed on a
specific physical location. By doing so, memory waylaying
consumes a negligible amount of time and memory while
waiting for the target page to be loaded to the target physical
location. Hence, it is difficult to detect. Once the data is located
at the desired position, the attacker hits it with the Rowhammer
bit flip and exploits the modified binary to gain root privileges.
We describe memory waylaying in detail in Section VIII.
VI. OPCODE FLIPPING
In this section, we describe opcode flipping, a generic
technique for exploiting bit flips in cached copies of binary
files. All previous generic Rowhammer privilege-escalation
attacks (i.e., obtaining root privileges) induced bit flips in the
page number field of an attacker-generated page table, in order
to change the memory page reference by some page table
entry. Seaborn and Dullien [65] (cf. Section II-A for a detailed
discussion) bypassed sandbox code sanitization by flipping bits
in a bitmask used in a logical and in attacker-sprayed code.
In contrast to previous work, we identify potential target bit
flips in any opcode in a shared binary or library, modifying
opcodes and the instruction stream. In contrast to previous
Rowhammer attacks based on memory spraying, the binary
pages we attack cannot be sprayed and only exist a single
time in the entire memory. In order to find suitable bit
flips in system binaries, we used the following methodology.
First, we manually define ranges within in the binary for
which bits could be flipped. We then automatically test every
single bit flip in these ranges, grouping the modified binaries
by the result of their corresponding execution. Finally we
manually analyze the results, looking for devastating outcomes
(such a obtaining root permissions without knowing the root
password) and target these bits via our Rowhammer attack.
Opcode flipping exploits that bit flips in opcodes can yield
other, yet valid, opcodes. These opcodes are often very similar
to the original opcode but have different, possibly inverted,
semantics. One prerequisite of opcode flipping is the ability
to flip a bit of a target binary page with surgical precision. For
now, we assume that the attacker can cause such a precise bit
flip and discuss the effect of such bit flips, before we show in
Section VIII how a file can be placed in memory accordingly.
Opcode Flipping Case Study. To illustrate opcode flipping
we consider the example of a single bit flip in the x86 opcode
JE = 0x74 (jump if equal). A single bit flip in this opcode
can yield the opcodes JNE = 0x75 (jump if not equal),
JBE = 0x76 (jump if below or equal), JO = 0x70 (jump
if overflow), JL = 0x7C (jump if lower), PUSHQ = 0x54
(push quad word), XORB = 0x34 (xor byte), HLT = 0xF4
(halt), and the prefix 0x64. Only 21 out of 255 two-byte
sequences starting with the prefix 0x64 are illegal opcodes.
Similarly, flips in TEST instructions preceding a conditional
jump have the same effect. For example, with a single bit flip,
the instruction TEST EAX,EAX, which sets the zero flag if
EAX is zero, can be transformed to XCHG EAX,EAX, which
never modifies the zero flag. Tests and conditional jumps are
used in virtually all computer programs, and they control the
decision logic of the programs. Therefore, we focus on flips
in these instructions. As we show, bit flips in such instructions
are sufficient to achieve our goals.
Exploitable Opcodes in Real-World Binaries. To exploit
opcode flipping for privilege escalation, we target userspace
applications with the setuid bit set, which are run as root.
On Ubuntu 17.04, there are 16 setuid binaries owned by
root, all being potential targets for privilege escalation using
a bit flip. We analyzed one of the most prominent targets
for privilege escalation, the sudo binary and sudoers.so
shared library (henceforth sudo binary).
We identified two regions in the sudo binary in which a
bit flip can be exploited. First, the check whether the user is
allowed to use sudo, i.e., if the user is in the sudoers file.
Second, the check whether the entered password is correct. In
this work, we focus on the latter.
We located 29 different offsets in the binary where a bit
flip breaks the password verification logic. All identified bit
flips affect the test or the conditional jump of the password-
verification location. Successful attacks on the conditional
jump change the condition so that it treats an incorrect pass-
word as if it was correct. Attacks on the test instruction result
in different operations which ensure that the zero flag is clear,
either by clearing it, e.g., ADD AL,0xC0, or by maintaining
the previous, clear, value. We provide a list with offsets and
their effect on the opcode at this position, in Appendix A.
As shown in the following section, bit flip positions in
memory are uniformly distributed, allowing exploitation of any
of the 29 offsets in the sudo binary to gain root privileges.
VII. ONE-LOCATION ROWHAMMER
In this section, we describe the hammering technique we
use to induce bit flips. We assume that the attacker already
knows exploitable bit offsets in binaries and only searches
for memory locations where these bit offsets can be flipped
through Rowhammer. We propose one-location Rowhammer
as a novel alternative technique based on previously unknown
Rowhammer effects. The scanning is performed from within
the enclave and hence, cannot be observed through perfor-
mance counters, source-code analysis or binary analysis.
Previous work described two different hammering tech-
niques, double-sided hammering, and single-sided hammering,
as described in more detail in Section II-A.
One-location hammering truly hammers only one memory
location, i.e., the attacker does not directly induce row conflicts
but only re-opens one row permanently. The core of one-
location hammering is a Flush+Reload loop hammering a
single randomly chosen address, voiding the assumptions of
defense class D3. Both, one-location hammering and single-
sided hammering are oblivious to virtual-to-physical address
mappings. Hence, we can also apply both hammering tech-
niques if physical address mappings are not available.
We studied the distribution of bit flips over 4 kB-aligned
memory regions, i.e., pages, as this alignment can be ob-
tained through our memory waylaying technique described in
Section VIII. We performed our analysis on a Skylake i7-
6700K with two 8GB Crucial DDR4-2133 DIMMs. We tested
each technique for eight hours and scanned for bit flips after
each hammering attempt (i.e., after 5 000 000 rounds of Flush+
Reload on two or one address, respectively). Each hammering
attempt hammers random memory locations (randomly-chosen
offsets on more than 100 000 randomly-chosen 4 kB pages).
(a) Double-sided (b) Single-sided (c) One-location
Fig. 1: Flippable bit offsets over 4 kB-aligned memory regions
for different hammering techniques. Bit flips from 0 to 1 (blue)
and bit flips from 1 to 0 (red) may occur at any bit offset.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of bit flip offsets accumulated
over 4 kB-aligned memory regions for double-sided hammer-
ing, single-sided hammering, and one-location hammering. We
observe that 25 223 out of 32 768 bit offsets (77.0%) can be
flipped using double-sided hammering on at least one 4 kB-
offset. 51.7% of the bit flips were from 0 to 1.
Single-sided hammering does not induce more bit flips than
double-sided hammering. However, regarding bit offsets, we
observe an even slightly more uniform distribution for single-
sided hammering, with 25 722 bit offsets (78.5%). 54.1% of
the bit flips were from 0 to 1.
One-location hammering only flipped 11 969 out of 32 768
bit offsets (36.5%) on at least one 4 kB-offset. 51.6% of the
bit flips were from 0 to 1. This is worse than double-sided
hammering and single-sided hammering. Still, our results show
for the first time, that one-location hammering drains sufficient
charge from the DRAM cells to induce bit flips.
We validated our results by reproducing them in a short
series of tests on a Haswell i7-4790 with two Kingston DDR3-
1600 DIMMs. We observe bit flips for all hammering tech-
niques, including one-location hammering. On an Ivy Bridge
i5-3230M with two Samsung DDR3-1600 SO-DIMMs we
observe a significantly higher number of bit flips for double-
sided hammering than for single-sided hammering, while bit
flips from one-location hammering were rare and not reliably
reproducible. Our measurements indicate that this machine
uses an open-page memory controller policy, as opposed to
the more efficient policies used on the other two systems (cf.
Appendix C). However, bit flips from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0
have approximately the same probability on all three systems.
Our data shows that the bit flips over pages generally follow
a uniform distribution if a significant amount of memory is
tested. As our attacker aims at finding bit flips for specific
offsets on 4 kB pages, the runtime of the bit flip templating
phase depends on the number of exploitable bit flip offsets.
In case of the 29 bit offsets we found in sudo, the expected
runtime on our Skylake system is less than 17 minutes per
target bit flip for double-sided hammering, and less than
19 minutes for single-sided hammering. With one-location
hammering the expected runtime increases to 56 minutes until
a target bit flip is found. Hence, one-location hammering is
3.3 times slower in finding the target bit flip than comparable
hammering methods. If evasion of defense class D3 is a goal,
a slow-down factor of 3.3 is practical.
Deciding to run the stealthy templating longer than nec-
essary, i.e., searching for more than one bit flip, reduces the
runtime of the waylaying phase (cf. Section VIII) significantly,
as the attacker learns more addresses suitable for the attack.
The templating only keeps the CPU core of the enclave
busy but causes no other system utilization, i.e., it does not
exhaust memory, as we rely on the memory allocation of our
waylaying technique, that we present in the following section.
VIII. MEMORY WAYLAYING
The attacker knows which bit offsets in pages of binaries to
target to obtain root privileges, and how to hammer physical
memory locations to obtain a bit flip at the right bit offset. The
remaining problem is the inherent challenge of Rowhammer:
Placing the target page at a physical location where the
required bit flip can be induced. The known approaches to
solve this challenge are spraying, i.e., filling the entire memory
with copies of the page, or grooming, i.e., allocating the target
page in exactly the right moment [74]. However, the page
cache keeps every binary page only once in memory. Linux
prioritizes keeping binary pages in memory upon eviction.
Hence, spraying is not applicable in our attack and grooming
would require out-of-memory situations to force eviction of
the binary page. In this section, we present memory waylay-
ing, a reliable approach to solving the challenge of memory
placement. It is a generic stealthy alternative to spraying and
grooming, relying on a prediction oracle to determine whether
a target page is at the right physical memory location.
In Section VIII-A, we show how the prefetch side-channel
attack [23] can be leveraged as an oracle. In Section VIII-B,
we present a technique to evict a target page from the page
cache, forcing relocation at the next access. In Section VIII-C,
we describe how the prefetch attack and the page cache
eviction are combined to the stealthy memory waylaying. We
also present a fast variant, called memory chasing, which
sacrifices stealth for speed, with no sacrifice of reliability.
A. Prefetch-based Prediction Oracle
In our memory waylaying attack, the attacker monitors page
placement to detect mapping of one of the offsets in binaries
and shared libraries to one of the target memory locations. We
use the prefetch address-translation oracle [23] to perform this
monitoring. The oracle exploits the direct-physical mapping in
the Linux kernelspace. The prefetch address-translation oracle
provides an attacker with the information whether two virtual
addresses map to the same physical address, even in the
presence of address-space layout randomization.
The address-translation oracle consists of two steps, a se-
quence of prefetch instructions and a Flush+Reload attack, to
measure the effect of the prefetch. While the attack is prone to
false negatives due to ignored prefetch instructions, the Flush+
Reload attack at its core has virtually no false positives [73],
i.e., there is no cache hit if the address was not actually
cached. While both steps can generally be executed in SGX
enclaves, performing a Flush+Reload attack requires highly
accurate timing measurements. On SGX2, rdtsc is available
within enclaves. On SGX1, Schwarz et al. [64] demonstrated
that accurate timing can be obtained by using counting threads
and Wang et al. [69] mirrored rdtsc into the enclave. Our
experiments with both approaches show that we can use either
to obtain sufficiently accurate timing inside enclaves.
The address-translation oracle is first used in our attack to
determine offsets in the direct-physical map with exploitable
bit flips. It is then used a second time, to continuously monitor
the set of target addresses during the memory waylaying.
When an address match is detected, the next step of the attack
is triggered, i.e., hitting the target page with Rowhammer.
Our prefetch address-translation oracle, which we optimized
for stability, experienced no false positives over a time frame
of 3737 seconds and a true positive every 4.5 seconds, i.e.,
the expected value for the true positive rate is 50% when
measuring for 4.5 seconds. When optimized for performance
we can achieve the same performance as Gruss et al. [23], i.e.,
an expected measurement time of less than 50 milliseconds per
address without false positives, but with a higher false negative
rate. The search for the physical addresses is combined into
one prefetch side-channel attack, i.e., one prefetch operation
and as many Flush+Reload loops as page translations the
attacker wants to find. Hence, the runtime does not increase
significantly with the number of addresses, but only linearly
in the amount of system memory.
B. Page Cache Eviction
Both on Windows and Linux, files are cached page-wise in
the file page cache upon the first access to the corresponding
page. Any subsequent access to a page of a file is directly
served from the page cache. Thus, one prerequisite for memory
waylaying is a technique to deterministically evict a page of a
file from the page cache. Eviction ensures that any subsequent
access to the file cannot be served from the page cache
anymore, and the file is mapped to a new physical location.
Any unprivileged process could evict data from the page
cache by simply allocating a large amount of memory, such
that page cache pages must be evicted. This is similar to
the memory exhaustion techniques in previous Rowhammer
attacks and risks system crashes due to out of memory
situations [24, 65, 68]. We examined the behavior of the page
cache replacement algorithm to find a more reliable way to
trigger eviction. While Linux provides privileged interfaces
to do so, we need an approach which works without any
privileges and from within enclaves, i.e., only with regular
memory accesses.
A fundamental observation we made is that the replacement
algorithm of the Linux page cache prioritizes eviction of non-
executable pages over executable pages. However, it does
evict executable pages when filling the page cache with read-
only executable pages. On Windows, executable and non-
executable file-backed pages can be used equally. This forms
a basic primitive that allows us to efficiently and reliably
evict a selected page from the page cache. Because the
page cache only uses otherwise unused memory pages, the
technique does not result in memory pressure and avoids the
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Fig. 2: Our replacement-aware page cache eviction only leads
to negligible memory increase, whereas existing techniques
are close to an out-of-memory situation.
unresponsiveness and out-of-memory situations that memory
exhaustion causes [24, 65, 68].
For both approaches, memory exhaustion and replacement-
aware page cache eviction, the amount of data which has to
be accessed is at most the total amount of main memory in
the system. To evaluate how much memory has to be allocated
for the eviction to be successful, we use the Linux mincore
function. The mincore function tells whether a given page is
in the page cache. An attacker could also use this function to
optimize the page cache eviction during an attack, i.e., abort
the replacement-aware page cache eviction as soon as the page
to be evicted is not in the page cache anymore. However, this
is a trade-off between stealth and performance, as the OS can
monitor calls to the mincore function.
We evaluated our replacement-aware page cache eviction
on an Intel Core i5-6200U with 12GB of main memory. For
the experiment, we kept the system at an typical workload,
namely a browser, a mail client, and a music player were
running during the experiment. Figure 2 compares traditional
memory exhaustion with our replacement-aware page cache
eviction to evict a specific page (in our experiment a page
of the sudo binary) from the page cache. Our replacement-
aware page cache eviction only incurs a slight increase of
used memory, whereas the exhaustion-based technique is close
to an out-of-memory situation. In 0.78% of our exhaustion
tests, the test program was even terminated by the OS due
to excessive memory usage. In contrast, our replacement-
aware page cache eviction never leads to an out-of-memory
situation. On average, for our replacement-aware page cache
eviction, it was sufficient to access 5544MB of data to evict
the target page of the sudo binary from the page cache. The
replacement-aware page cache eviction takes on average 2.68
seconds. For higher workloads, an attacker has to access even
less data to evict a specific page from the page cache, as the
size of the page cache decreases with the memory usage of
active applications. On Windows, the page cache eviction takes
on average 10.10 seconds, as we cannot rely on the Linux
mincore function to abort the eviction process.
C. Positioning Memory Pages
We combine the prefetch translation oracle (cf. Sec-
tion VIII-A) and the replacement-aware page cache eviction
(cf. Section VIII-B) to maneuver a target page on one of
the physical locations with a bit flip (cf. Section VII). As an
extension to memory waylaying, which is slow but stealthy,
we also propose memory chasing, a faster non-stealthy variant.
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Fig. 4: Distribution of placements of a page in the physical
memory of our test system (12GB). Each square represents
4MB. Hatched (red) areas are unavailable to the system
(e.g., graphics memory). The darker (blue) an area, the more
physical pages were in this area. Even a small number of
relocations covers most of the physical memory.
Both memory waylaying and memory chasing, leverage
the prefetch translation oracle to test whether our exploitable
page is at the correct (i.e., vulnerable) physical page. As the
physical page usually does not change often (i.e., only if there
is high memory pressure or the system is rebooted), memory
waylaying periodically evicts the page cache. On a subsequent
access to the target page, the access cannot be served from the
page cache anymore, and a new physical page is allocated and
mapped. This procedure works the same way on Windows and
Linux, as illustrated in Figure 3.
We evaluate the distribution of physical page numbers used
for a specific binary page on one of our test systems, an
Intel Core i5 with 12GB of main memory. We repeated the
memory waylaying process 57 000 times, i.e., the binary page
was relocated 57 000 times. Out of these 57 000 relocations,
we found 46 720 unique physical page numbers, i.e., the
probability of maneuvering the binary to a physical location
where it was already is only 18% after 57 000 tries. Figure 4
visualizes the distribution of the 57 000 relocations in physical
memory. We observe that even the small number of relocations
we tested (i.e., 1.8% of all pages) covered most of the physical
memory, with the exception of occupied memory regions.
Thus, eventually the target binary page is placed at a physical
memory location where the intended bit flip can be induced.
The advantage of memory waylaying over conventional
techniques, such as grooming or spraying, is that it is stealthy,
as it does not exhaust the memory. The OS page cache is
designed to occupy any unused page in the system. Most
pages are rarely accessed, but it is still more efficient to keep
them in memory than to reload them from the disk. Memory
waylaying exploits this design, and as a consequence, it has
no impact on memory utilization and only negligible impact
on the overall system performance, as the page cache simply
keeps a different set of pages in the otherwise unused memory.
In Section IX-B, we detail the runtime of the waylaying phase
in a practical example.
The disadvantage of memory waylaying is that the runtime
can vary widely, from a few hours up to a few days, until the
target page is placed on the correct physical location. As a
faster solution, we propose memory chasing, an adaption of
memory waylaying which sacrifices stealth for speed. Instead
of waiting for the target page to be placed on a different
physical page, we actively “chase” the binary in physical
memory until it is at the correct physical page. Memory
chasing runs outside of the enclave as it has a stronger
interaction with userspace library functions. To change the
physical page of a target binary, memory chasing exploits the
copy-on-write effect of fork as follows:
1) mmap the binary as private and writable.
2) Fork the current process.
3) In the child process, write to the mapped binary. This
ensures that the page is copied to a new physical page.
4) Kill the parent process to release the old physical page.
5) Repeat until the page is at the intended physical location
(check using the prefetch translation oracle)
Although the binary content is now at the correct physical
location, the page cache still holds the first version of the
binary page, as the current page is dirty (i.e., modified). Thus,
we have to trick the kernel into replacing the old binary page
with the current one. We do this by evicting the page cache as
described in Section VIII-B. This removes the old (cached)
binary page from the page cache. After the page cache is
evicted, we unmap the current binary page and immediately
map it again, however, this time with read-only and execute
permissions. This ensures that the freed physical page is used
to cache the binary in the page cache.
Memory chasing is considerably faster than memory way-
laying, as the page cache has to be evicted only once. Moving
the physical page with memory chasing takes on average
only 36.7 µs, whereas memory waylaying requires 2.68 s. On
Windows, we could not test memory chasing as there is
no equivalent to the fork function. With 10.10 s, memory
waylaying requires slightly more time on Windows. However,
both techniques have the advantage of not exhausting the
memory in contrast to memory spraying and grooming. One
disadvantage of memory chasing is the large number of fork
system calls, occupying one CPU core. Therefore, depending
on how stealthy the attack must be, the attacker chooses which
of the two primitives to use for reliable page cache eviction.
In Section IX-B, we detail the runtime of memory chasing in
a practical example.
IX. EVALUATION OF ATTACKS IN NATIVE AND CLOUD
ENVIRONMENTS
In this section, we summarize our attacks and evaluate them
in practical scenarios. We first consider a cloud scenario with
a simple attack, where an attacker is able to run our attack in
virtual machines on multiple cloud servers. We then consider a
local scenario with our full attack, where an attacker is able to
run our attack on personal computers and performs a privilege-
escalation attack. We detail the procedural steps of the attacks
as well as the corresponding runtime.
A. Abusing SGX for Denial-of-Service Attacks in the Cloud
Cloud servers are typically less susceptible to Rowhammer
bit flips due to the presence of ECC, double refresh rates,
and slower DRAM modules [57]. In the cloud scenario, the
attacker uses our attack to identify vulnerable servers and take
these servers down in a coordinated and distributed attack, i.e.,
a denial-of-service attack. In this attack, we do not aim for
privilege escalation and hence, neither perform opcode flipping
nor memory waylaying. The attacker runs an unprivileged
SGX enclave to evade defense classes D1 and D2.
If, as discussed in Section II-D, an attacker induces bit flips
in the encrypted memory area (EPC) of SGX, the CPU locks
the memory controller (potentially incurring data corruption),
causing the system to halt until it is rebooted manually. Note
that only a tiny fraction of 4 kB pages are adjacent to the
128MB EPC memory area. For instance, on a system with
16GB dual-channel dual-rank DDR4 memory, only 256 pages
(0.006% of all pages) are in an adjacent DRAM row. As
different allocation mechanisms are used to allocate EPC
pages and normal world pages, the attacker cannot accidentally
hammer EPC addresses. Hence, it is extremely unlikely to
accidentally flip a bit in the EPC memory region.
Many cloud providers use KVM [27] or Xen [7] to run
multiple virtual machines of different tenants in parallel on
the same physical hardware. To expose SGX features to virtual
machines, Intel published the necessary kernel patches [32, 33,
34]. Recently, Microsoft [51] introduced Azure confidential
computing that enables developers to use SGX in their cloud.
Our “distributed” denial-of-service attack consists of two
phases, seek and destroy:
• Seek. The attacker launches the attack enclave on many
hosts in the cloud (i.e., “distributed”), and templates the
DRAM for possible bit flips. The runtime of this phase is
in the range of multiple hours. As the position of bit flips
is uniformly distributed, an attacker learns from any bit flip
while templating, that the DRAM very likely also vulnerable
to bit flips in the EPC region used by SGX.
• Destroy. The attacker shuts down every vulnerable ma-
chine found in phase 1, by simultaneously triggering bit
flips in EPC memory. The runtime of this phase is in the
range of seconds to minutes.
Besides ethical considerations on performing this exper-
iment on a public cloud provider, we also found that no
public cloud provider offers SGX support. Microsoft’s Azure
confidential computing [51] can only be used as an early access
program, that we have not been granted access to. Instead, we
performed the first part of our experiment on a dual CPU
server system with two Intel Haswell-EP Xeon E5-2630 v3,
a setup commonly found in public clouds. We equipped the
system with two Crucial DDR4-2133 DIMMs known to be
susceptible to Rowhammer bit flips. Our experiments showed
that due to the significantly lower clock frequency (60–76%
of the clock frequency of an Intel Skylake i7-6700K) and
the by-default doubled refresh rate, bit flips are much rarer.
Specifically, we observed only 3 bit flips in an 8 hour test.
However, this is sufficient for our denial-of-service attack.
In the second phase, our Rowhammer enclave starts to
simultaneously hammer DRAM rows in the EPC on all
hosts. By triggering a bit flip within this memory region, the
machine locks the memory controller (potentially incurring
data corruption) and causes the system to halt until reboot.
As our Intel Haswell-EP system does not support Intel
SGX, we performed the second part of our practical analysis
on an Intel Skylake i7-6700K. We verified that we are able
to reproducibly crash the system within 10 seconds when
hammering DRAM rows used by the EPC, as Intel SGX
locked down the memory controller, halting the system and
forcing us to power off the system manually. We observed
that occasionally, after powering on the system again, the
system did not boot beyond the BIOS for several minutes.
After powering the system off and on again another time, the
system regularly booted again.
Our results show that SGX introduces a significant security
risk for cloud providers, allowing an attacker to cause hard-
to-trace denial-of-service attacks and coordinated simultane-
ous take-down of multiple cloud servers, e.g., in the Azure
confidential computing cloud [51]. As the attack hurts the
availability and reliability of the cloud provider, it is especially
interesting for parties with conflicting economic interests.
While the same attack could also be applied to a large num-
ber of personal computers, it is unclear how an attacker would
profit from denial-of-service attacks on personal computers,
especially in the face of the full privilege-escalation attack we
detail in the next subsection.
In a concurrent independent work, Jang et al. [36] propose
a similar attack, making the same observations as we did:
the system reset does not work properly following bit flips in
SGX; any bit flip in the 128MB region causes the system
to halt, making the attack easier than other Rowhammer
attacks; all detection mechanisms are bypassed by hiding the
Rowhammer code inside an enclave; and that just locking
down the processor in case of a bit flip might not be the
best defense scheme. As a defense, they propose that future
work should investigate whether there are non-process-specific
performance counters which allow detection of suspicious
activity in SGX enclaves.
B. Abusing SGX to Hide Privilege-Escalation Attacks
Personal computers are more susceptible to Rowhammer bit
flips, as they usually are not equipped with ECC-RAM. In this
scenario, the attacker uses our full attack for privilege escala-
tion from a regular unprivileged process to root privileges. The
crucial building blocks of this attack are opcode flipping and
memory waylaying. The attacker runs an unprivileged SGX
enclave to evade defense classes D1 and D2.
TABLE III: Optimal parameters and runtime of the attack.
Method Bitflips Templating Waylaying Total
Double-sided, waylaying 91 26.1h 69.4h 95.5h
Single-sided, waylaying 87 27.5h 70.6h 98.1h
One-location, waylaying 50 47.3h 90.5h 137.8h
Double-sided, chasing 1 0.7h 43.7h 44.4h
Single-sided, chasing 1 0.7h 43.7h 44.4h
One-location, chasing 1 1.3h 44.0h 45.4h
In our example attack, we apply opcode flipping (cf. Sec-
tion VI) to exploit bit flips in opcodes in the sudo binary
of an up-to-date Ubuntu distribution. Bit flips at some offsets
in the binary (Section VI) cause a skipping of authentication
checks and, thus, provide us with root privileges.
The local attack requires two preparation steps:
• Offline Preparation. The attacker determines which bit
flip offsets in standard system executable binaries and shared
libraries are exploitable. This step is repeated for a large
number of binaries and shared libraries of different distri-
butions and versions. The result of the offline preparation
is a database of files, versions, and bit flip offsets (cf.
Section VI). In this phase, we identified 29 exploitable bit
offsets in sudo.
• Online Preparation. The attacker verifies that the binary
and library versions on the target systems are in the database.
This is very likely the case if the victim uses a default
installation of a popular Linux distribution, e.g., Ubuntu,
as all binaries and libraries are pre-compiled and hence,
identical on virtually every installation.
After the preparation steps are completed, the attacker contin-
ues with the main attack, consisting of four phases:
• Templating phase. Our Rowhammer enclave templates
memory for bit flips. This is done via single-sided ham-
mering or one-location hammering (cf. Section VII), which
both are oblivious to physical addresses and hence, perfectly
suited to be run in our Rowhammer enclave. To defeat
defense class D3, the attacker can use one-location hammer-
ing. The memory is allocated via memory-mapped files (cf.
Section VIII), causing no significant increase in the resident
memory and, thus, avoiding out-of-memory situations.
The runtime of the templating phase and the waylaying
phase pose an optimization problem (see Appendix B).
Table III shows the optimal solution for our scenario, e.g.,
the runtime with one-location hammering is 47.3 hours
if followed by waylaying, and 1.3 hours if followed by
memory chasing. Interruptions during this time frame are
no problem, as the attacker tests independent memory lo-
cations and does not lose data over interruptions. During
the templating, the enclave occupies one CPU core, which
is visible to the OS but which could also be explained
by completely benign enclave operations. The result of the
templating phase is a list of physical pages with bit flips
matching those from the preparation phase.
• Waylaying phase. Our Rowhammer enclave uses a side
channel to wait until one of the vulnerable target binary or
library pages is placed on one of the exploitable memory
locations (cf. Section VIII). The prefetch-based prediction
oracle tells us when the page has been loaded at the correct
position. Next, then we flip the bit in the opcode using one-
location hammering in the hammering phase.
The runtime of the waylaying phase depends on the number
of bit flips found in the templating phase. Table III shows the
optimal solution for our scenario, e.g., the runtime with one-
location hammering is 90.5 hours for memory waylaying
and 44.0 hours for memory chasing. The result of the
waylaying phase is that a target binary page is placed on
the right physical page to trigger a predictable bit flip.
• Hammering phase. The hammering phase only takes
a few milliseconds, as it only induces the predictable bit
flip on the target page using Rowhammer. The attacker can
verify whether a bit was flipped by reading the content of
the binary page. Thus, the result of the hammering phase
is an unauthorized modification of the target binary, i.e., in
our case a malicious sudo binary.
• Exploitation phase. As the binary page in memory
now contains the modified opcodes, the privilege check in
the target binary, i.e., sudo, is circumvented. Hence, the
attacker simply runs the attacked binary and, thus, obtains
root privileges. Consequently, the exploitation phase also has
a negligible runtime.
We performed all attack steps on an i7-6700K, showing that
the attack can be mounted in practice. Furthermore, we vali-
dated the templating on two other systems, an i5-3230M with
Samsung DDR3-1600 memory, and an i7-4790 with Kingston
DDR3-1600 memory. We also validated the waylaying phase
by running it for several days as a background process on
a second machine (an i5-6200U), confirming that the user
does not notice any attack activity and that it does not cause
any system crashes. To eliminate traces or avoid potential
instabilities due to the binary modifications, an attacker can
restore the unmodified binary page by simply evicting the
page cache once more. Upon the next access, the unmodified
version is reloaded from the disk.
Our attack shows that existing countermeasures for com-
modity systems are incomplete and fundamental assumptions
need to be refined to design effective countermeasures.
X. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss limitations of our approach and
additional observations we made while conducting our study.
A. Limitations
One limitation of our work is that an attacker in the native
attack scenario likely needs to get a Rowhammer enclave
signed by a signing entity, e.g., Intel or a BIOS vendor, to
be able to launch the enclave. While this sounds like a solid
solution to prevent Rowhammer attacks through enclaves in
practice, investigations on a very similar setting show that
this is not the case [15]. It is very well possible to slip
malware into app stores [15]. Furthermore, most works on
applications of SGX suggest that it can be used to keep
the code and data secret from any third party [5, 49, 63].
Especially for secure cloud computation it is not plausible
to run only signed enclaves, i.e., a cloud provider will run
non-signed user enclaves. This would allow an attacker to run
our attack as well. Consequently, a different solution must be
found to prevent Rowhammer attacks through SGX enclaves.
Although far more stealthy than spraying and grooming,
memory waylaying is still observable by the OS. The OS
could prevent allocating too many page cache pages in a sin-
gle process. However, high memory requirements could also
be perfectly reasonable, e.g., trusted video processing [47],
operations on large encrypted database files [14, 42, 55, 63].
Hence, it is unclear whether memory allocation patterns alone
are enough to give away a Rowhammer attack. There is no
further interaction between the enclave and the non-enclave
sides that could be monitored to detect the attack. Finally,
future software defenses may still prevent our attack, e.g., by
checking the integrity of binaries and terminating processes
when an integrity check fails.
SGX enclaves should only be run if they are signed by
Intel or a trusted partner. If Intel or one of the trusted partners
do not thoroughly review the code before singing it, our
attack might slip through the signing process. However, as
this enclave signing process has not yet been deployed, it is
unclear whether such a code review would actually happen.
Perhaps more devastating is that fact that users and businesses
can deliberately run non-signed enclaves. In fact, Microsoft al-
ready does this on the Azure confidential computing cloud [51].
Hence, it is unclear whether a signing process would pose any
limitation for our attack.
Currently, in our opcode flipping technique, the identifica-
tion of target bit flip locations in binaries requires some manual
work. That is, manually defining a range where bit flips should
be tested and manually selecting the groups of successful
execution results. While this is certainly feasible for a small
number of binaries, fully automating this process would allow
a complete analysis of the attack surface. Similarly, compilers
could generate code which guarantees that an attacker requires
at least N bit flips to successfully manipulate the control flow,
i.e., N is a security parameter (cf. [9, 16]). We consider this
an interesting direction of future work, not only for research
on Rowhammer attacks but also on fault attacks in general.
B. Rowhammer mitigations in hardware
While it might be possible to design a practical software-
based Rowhammer countermeasure, the results of our paper
indicate that this is difficult, since not all variants of trig-
gering the Rowhammer bug are known. Furthermore, future
Rowhammer defenses should also be designed with related
fault attacks in mind [40, 46]. We now discuss proposed and
existing countermeasures implemented that require hardware
modifications, but tackle the problem at its root.
ECC RAM can detect and correct 1-bit errors and, thus,
deal with single bit flips caused by the Rowhammer attack.
Furthermore, IBM’s Chipkill error correction [30] allows to
successfully recover from 3-bit errors. However, uncorrectable
multi-bit flips can be exploitable [2, 3, 48] or can result in a
denial-of-service attack similar as described in Section IX-A
depending on how the OS responds to the error. While
only modern AMD Ryzen processors support ECC RAM in
consumer hardware, Intel restricts its support to server CPUs,
thus, making it unavailable in commodity systems.
While the LPDDR4 [37] implements TRR and MAC,
van der Veen [67] still reported bit flips on a Google Pixel
phone with 4GB LPDDR4 memory. Doubling the refresh rate
has been shown to be insufficient [6, 44] and a further increase
would incur a too high performance penalty [44].
Meaney et al. [50] introduced a redundant array of indepen-
dent memory (RAIM) system as a feature of IBM’s zEnterprise
servers, which is basically the memory-equivalent for RAID
systems for hard disks. For an uncorrectable error, an attacker
would have to induce multiple bit flips in different rows of
different modules, making Rowhammer attacks infeasible.
Kim et al. [44] and Kim et al. [43] proposed to eliminate
bit flips in hardware by probabilistically opening adjacent or
non-adjacent rows, whenever a row is opened or closed. As
ongoing Rowhammer attacks open and close a certain row
repeatedly, the vulnerable adjacent rows would be refreshed
before bit flips occur. Their approaches are possible solutions
to mitigate Rowhammer attacks in future hardware.
C. Design of SGX
Intel SGX aims at protecting code from untrusted third
parties. Indeed, we see that it perfectly hides our attack
from different defense mechanisms. While this is intentional
behavior and shows that SGX works, the question arises
how to cope with harmful code within SGX enclaves, which
eventually will happen in the wild.
A more discerning problem of SGX is that it halts the
entire system, e.g., a cloud system. This is a powerful tool
for attackers regardless of whether they run in the normal
world or within an SGX enclave. Taking down entire clouds,
possibly in a coordinated and distributed way, poses a security
risk. Instead of halting the system, it would be less dangerous
for the provider to only stop the running enclaves and return
corresponding error codes to the host application. A similar
design change was also proposed by Jang et al. [36].
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that even a combination of all
state-of-the-art Rowhammer defenses does not prevent Row-
hammer attacks. Our novel attack and exploitation primitives
systematically undermine the assumptions of all defenses.
With one-location hammering, we showed that previous as-
sumptions on how the Rowhammer bug can be triggered are
invalid and keeping only one DRAM row constantly open is
sufficient to induce bit flips. With a slow-down factor of only
3.3, it is still on par with previous (now mitigated) techniques.
With opcode flipping, we bypass all memory layout-based
defenses by flipping bits in a predictable and targeted way
in the userspace sudo binary. We present 29 bit offsets,
each allowing an attacker to obtain root privileges in practice.
With memory waylaying, we present a reliable technique
to replace conspicuous and unstable memory spraying and
grooming techniques. Coaxing the OS into relocating any
binary page takes 2.68 s with our stealth-optimized variant,
and only 36.7 µs with our speed-optimized variant. Finally,
we leveraged Intel SGX to hide the full privilege-escalation
attack, making any inspection or detection of the attack infea-
sible. Consequently, our attack evades all previously proposed
countermeasures for commodity systems.
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APPENDIX
A. Bitflips in sudo
Table IV lists exploitable bitflip offsets that modify opcodes
of sudoers.so (Ubuntu 17.04, sudo version 1.8.19p1)
yielding a skip of the privilege check and, thus, elevating an
unprivileged process to root privileges.
B. Computing the Optimal Runtime of our Attack
The runtime of our attack is computed as
P · (W + n · 0.05)
212 · n +
n · 216
F · E +
120 · P
230
seconds, where P is the amount of physical memory installed
in the system, W is the amount of time one waylaying
relocation takes, F is the flip rate (i.e., bit flips per second),
and E is the number of exploitable bit offsets within a 4 kB
page (which depends on the target binary). n ∈ N is the
optimization parameter, the number of bit flips to find in the
templating phase, influencing the runtime of the templating
phase and the waylaying phase. 0.05 seconds is the time
the prefetch address-translation oracle consumes for one test.
120 seconds is the amount of time the prefetch side-channel
attack consumes to translate a virtual to a physical address per
gigabyte (230 bytes) of system memory. The 216 represent the
215 bit offsets of a 4 kB page (212 bytes) which can flip in
both directions each.
On our test system we have P = 12 gigabytes, W = 2.68
seconds for memory waylaying, F = 0.67, and E = 29. With
these values we compute the runtime as
3 · 220 · (2.68 + n · 0.05)
n
+ n · 3373.3 + 24m
seconds. The minimum of this function is reached at n = 50.
Figure 5 shows the expected total runtime of the templating
phase, and memory waylaying and chasing, depending on
which hammering technique is used and how many bit offsets
are exploitable.
C. Memory Basics, Policies, and their Influence on One-
Location Hammering
DRAM is organized in multiple banks, e.g., for a dual-
channel dual-rank configuration 32 banks on DDR3 and 64
banks on DDR4. Each bank consists of an array of rows
of 8 kB each. Thus, the number of rows is typically in the
range of 214 to 216. Since the DRAM cells lose their charge
over time, the DDR standard defines that every row must be
refreshed once per 64 µs. When accessing a memory location,
TABLE IV: Exploitable bitflip offsets in sudoers.so.
# Binary offset Bitflip offset Original Flipped
1 0x8c1c 4 lea rdi, aUser_is_exempt lea rbp, aUser_is_exempt
2 0x8c32 3 mov eax, ebp mov eax, esp
3 0x8d4e 0 lea rax, off_250860 lea rax, off_250860+1
4 0x8d4f 0 lea rax, off_250860 lea rax, unk_250760
5 0x8d59 0 mov eax, [rax+2C8h] mov eax, [rax+2C9h]
6 0x8d59 1 mov eax, [rax+2C8h] mov eax, [rax+2CAh]
7 0x8d59 2 mov eax, [rax+2C8h] mov eax, [rax+2CCh]
8 0x8d59 3 mov eax, [rax+2C8h] mov eax, [rax+2C0h]
9 0x8d59 6 mov eax, [rax+2C8h] mov eax, [rax+288h]
10 0x8d5a 5 mov eax, [rax+2C8h] mov eax, [rax+22C8h]
11 0x8d5d 7 test eax, eax add eax, 485775C0h
12 0x8d5e 0 test eax, eax test ecx, eax
13 0x8d5f 0 jnz short check_user_is_exempt jz short check_user_is_exempt
14 0x8dbd 3 test al, al mov eax, es
15 0x8dbd 7 test al, al add al, 0C0h
16 0x8dbf 0 jnz short near ptr unk_8D61 jz short near ptr unk_8D61
17 0x8dbf 3 jnz short near ptr unk_8D61 jge short near ptr unk_8D61
18 0x8dc4 3 lea rbp, qword_252700 lea rbp, algn_2526F8
19 0x8dc5 1 lea rbp, qword_252700 lea rbp, dword_252900
20 0x8dc5 2 lea rbp, qword_252700 lea rbp, __imp_fflush
21 0x8dc9 3 mov eax, [rbp+0F0h] mov ecx, [rbp+0F0h]
22 0x8dc9 4 mov eax, [rbp+0F0h] mov edx, [rbp+0F0h]
23 0x8dca 7 mov eax, [rbp+0F0h] mov eax, [rbp+70h]
24 0x8dcb 3 mov eax, [rbp+0F0h] mov eax, [rbp+8F0h]
25 0x8dcf 0 test eax, eax test ecx, eax
26 0x8dcf 3 test eax, eax test eax, ecx
27 0x8dd0 2 jnz loc_8FB0 or eax, [rbp+1DAh]
28 0x8dd1 0 jnz loc_8FB0 jz loc_8FB0
29 0x8e23 6 jz loc_8FE8 jz near ptr algn_8FA7+1
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Fig. 5: Expected total runtime (templating and waylaying) until
the attacker has the target page at the target physical location.
the corresponding row is opened, i.e., copied into an internal
array called the row buffer. Closing a row copies the data from
the row buffer back into the actual DRAM cells.
Before a row can be opened, the bank has to be precharged.
Consequently, when accessing a memory location in the cur-
rently opened row, i.e., a row hit, the latency is comparably
low. Accessing a memory location in a different row, i.e., a row
conflict, incurs first closing the DRAM row, then precharging
the bank, and finally opening the new row, copying the data
into the row buffer. The latency in this case is significantly
higher, e.g., 200% of the latency of a row hit.
The memory controller can optimize the memory perfor-
mance by cleverly deciding when to close a row preemptively.
The two most basic memory controller policies are “open
page” and “closed page”. An open-page policy keeps the
recently accessed row open and buffered. This is beneficial
for memory access latency, power consumption, and bank
utilization when the number of memory accesses is low [41].
However, when the number of memory accesses increases
the situation is more complex. A closed-page policy can
then achieve a better system performance, since the row is
immediately closed and the bank is precharged and ready to
open a new row [41].
With modern processors having huge caches and complex
algorithms for spatial and temporal prefetching, the prob-
ability that further memory accesses go to the same row
decreases. Consequently, more complex memory controller
policies have been proposed and are implemented in modern
processors [41]. David et al. [20] noted that closed-page poli-
cies perform especially better on multi-core systems and hence
they assumed that these are implemented in current processor
architectures. Intel also holds patents for dynamically adjusting
memory controller policies [39]. A closed-page policy, but also
other policies which preemptively close rows, would allow
one-location hammering.
Besides these memory controller policies, the memory con-
troller can also reorder and combine memory accesses [61].
Since the Rowhammer bug is related to the number of row
activations [44], a lower number of activations due to reorder-
ing and combining also reduces the probability of bit flips. In
one-location hammering most of the accesses can be expected
to be reordered and combined to reduce the overall number
of row activations, leading to a lower number of bit flips than
with other hammering techniques.
